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CARBON MITIGATION POLICIES, DISTRIBUTIONAL DILEMMAS AND 
SOCIAL POLICIES 
 
Ian Gough 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary policies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have distributive consequences 
and thus implications for the scope and remit of social policy. This paper studies current carbon 
mitigation policies and their distributive impacts. It considers a range of current and proposed social 
programmes to ameliorate these impacts, before proposing alternatives. This argument is pursued in 
two parts according to whether emissions are conceived and accounted within a production or a 
consumption framework. The first part works within the Kyoto policy framework, critiques the 
present suite of policies and suggests alternative policy scenarios that may better marry together the 
goals of carbon reduction and social equity. The second half justifies and operationalises a broader 
focus on all GHGs emitted by British consumers, whether directly or embodied in goods and services. 
It argues that to target these will require going beyond the current policy paradigm to develop more 
radical policies to modify preferences and behaviour, and to constrain total consumption demand. It 
then speculates on ways that new social policy programmes might combine the pursuit of these 
goals together with social equity.  
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There is a strong scientific consensus that global warming is happening, that it is largely man-made, 
that it is global, cumulative and potentially destructive, and that it will have to be brought under 
control sooner or later if disaster is to be avoided (IPCC 2007, Stern 2007, Royal Society 2010, 
Committee on Climate Change 2010). This consensus is accepted by most Western governments, 
and the EU has played a leading role in implementing, and going beyond, the Kyoto Agreement, a 
legally-binding agreement ratified to date by 34 industrialised countries. The UK government is said 
to have adopted the world’s most demanding and legally binding targets to reduce CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).  
The policies implemented and planned to achieve these targets will have distributive consequences 
and thus implications for social justice and social policy, broadly conceived. Different groups have 
different responsibilities for climate change and suffer different impacts. Often these responsibilities 
and impacts work in opposite ways to create a ‘double’ or ‘triple’ injustice (Walker 2012, ch.8; 
Gough 2012). Understanding of this distributional dilemma developed first at the global level. 
However, it also surfaces within nations (both developed and developing). Reviewing the evidence 
for European countries, Pye at al (2008) conclude that households situated in the upper part of the 
income distribution contribute more to CO2 emissions in absolute terms than lower income 
households; that poor households suffer most from environmental degradation; and that common 
environmental policy measures tend to have regressive effects, burdening lower income households 
more (cf. Vanhille 2011). This article seeks to contribute to this research, and to the role of social 
policies in reconciling environmental and social justice goals. It is one partial response to Fitzpatrick’s 
(2011:4) call ‘to turn environmentalism and social policy from distant acquaintances into firm 
friends’.  
The main focus of the paper is on carbon mitigation policies (CMPs) and the distribution of 
emissions. (I ignore the second of Pye’s three aspect - the direct impacts of climate change within 
the UK, such as flood risks, drought risks and heat waves, and their unequal distribution - on these 
see Benzie et al. 2011, Walker and Burningham 2011, Defra Report 2012). It is a robust finding that 
many CMPs have regressive impacts; so various forms of countervailing policies are required if 
carbon mitigation is not to conflict with the pursuit of social equity and justice. Thus the sequence of 
my argument is as follows: 
Climate mitigation policies -> distributional dilemmas -> countervailing social policies 
This argument is then pursued in two parts according to whether emissions are conceived and 
accounted within a production or a consumption framework, a distinction discussed further in the 
next section. The first half works within the current targets and policy framework. It assesses the 
distributive impact of current CMPs and the current measures designed to reduce their regressive 
impact. It concludes by surveying and suggesting alternative policy scenarios that may better marry 
together the goals of carbon reduction and social equity.  
The second half broadens our focus to study the distribution of all GHGs embodied in the 
consumption of the British population. It argues that to target these will require going beyond the 
current policy paradigm to develop more radical policies to modify preferences and behaviour, and 
to constrain total consumption demand. It then speculates on ways that radical new social policy 
programmes might combine the pursuit of these goals together with social equity.  
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The conclusion is that the future will lie with novel forms of policy integration. Alongside ‘traditional’ 
social policies, new proactive, investment-focussed ‘eco-social policies’ will need to be developed:  
Climate mitigation policies -> distributional dilemmas -> countervailing social policies 
     Eco-social policies 
The paper provides a broad-brush tour d’horizon, trusting that enough detail is provided to back up 
the central arguments. But within the journal’s word limits discussion of some complex arguments is 
necessarily brief.  
 
CLIMATE CHANGE GOALS: FROM PAP TO CAP 
 
The Climate Change Act 2008 commits the UK to reduce GHG emissions by at least 80% by 2050 and 
by at least 34% by 2020, compared with the base year of 1990. Furthermore, it has set three 
intermediate carbon budgets for 2008-12, 2013-17 and 2018-22, and in May 2011 the coalition 
government committed the UK to further radical reductions for the fourth Budget period 2023-27. 
Figure 1 sets out the remarkable transformation in UK emissions this envisages.  
Figure 1. Planned rate of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, UK 2009-2050 
 
Source: Committee on Climate Change 2010:25. 
Yet even these targets only measure the amount of GHGs emitted within the territory of the UK. 
They do not track the emissions embodied in our growing volume of imports. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol a nation’s emissions are defined as those generated within its national boundaries. It uses 
the ‘production accounting principle’ (PAP) to calculate these emissions, including emissions 
generated in producing goods for export but ignoring those embodied in imported goods. This works 
to the advantage of most rich countries included in Annex I of the Protocol, which in general have 
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outsourced a growing share of their consumption during the last decades of globalisation.1 For this 
reason support has been growing for the alternative ‘consumption accounting principle’ (CAP) which 
measures the total emissions embodied in the consumption of inhabitants of the national territory in 
question (Bows and Barrett 2010).  
Figure 2. ‘Consumption gap’ in CO2 emissions since 1990: selected high emitting countries 
 
Source: House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee. 2012: 10. 
It is much more difficult to operationalise CAP since it ideally requires a multi-regional input-output 
model of the global economy (Turner et al 2007; Wiedmann et al 2007). At present no international 
data is available which meet this exacting standard, though the OECD is working on it. Figure 2 
presents data from the UK Energy Research Council, cited in the 2012 House of Commons Report on 
the subject. It shows that, while territorial emissions of CO2 in the UK declined by 19% from 1990 to 
2008, consumption-based emissions rose by 20%. By 2008 the UK exhibited a greater ‘leakage’ of 
emissions than any other major country. The report concluded ‘We are concerned that the UK could 
be meeting its domestic carbon budgets at the expense of the global carbon budget’ (p.10). Our own 
estimate of trade in total GHGs (including methane, nitrous oxide and hydroflourocarbons) finds an 
even wider gap (Gough et al 2011).  
                                                          
1 Annex 1 countries comprise the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, plus the 
Russian Federation and other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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There are two arguments for moving from PAP to CAP: ethical and political. Justice arguments 
concerning national responsibilities for climate change are complex and cannot be reviewed here 
but the ethical case for allocating responsibility according to per capita emissions of greenhouse 
gases is a powerful one (Walker 2012, ch.8).2 Moreover, outsourcing is driving up the emissions of 
non-Annex 1 countries, which current climate change negotiations are keen to draw into 
international agreements limiting GHGs. Bows and Barrett (2010) argue that a CAP approach can 
offer new opportunities for global carbon reduction. It would ease the emissions problems facing 
large exporters and thus the potential conflict between climate change and socio-economic 
development.  
The two parts of the article which follow consider in turn PAP and CAP emissions, treating within 
each relevant CMPs, the ensuing distributional dilemmas, and existing and proposed supporting 
social policies. 
 
PRODUCTION BASED EMISSIONS 
CURRENT CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICIES IN THE UK  
 
We begin with the official targets and contemporary climate mitigations policies in OECD countries. 
Climate mitigation embraces a huge range of policies, from developing renewable energy sources to 
sustainable agricultural practices, from insulating buildings to emissions trading systems, from waste 
disposal to labelling of refrigerators – and countless more besides. These can be summarized under 
three goals: explicit pricing of emissions, promoting clean energy, and improving energy efficiency. A 
recent OECD report (Bowen and Rydge 2011) provides an overview and evaluation of all such climate 
change policies in the United Kingdom (see also Marden and Gough 2011 for details).  
My focus is on the interaction between climate mitigation and social policy, so I will restrict myself to 
those programmes directed towards household actions and behaviours, namely carbon pricing and 
energy efficiency. These include direct government subsidies for thermal insulation, notably Warm 
Front and the Decent Homes programmes to improve social housing. More extensive are the 
programmes mandating energy companies to deliver certain energy efficiency benefits to lower 
income households, such as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) and the Community 
Energy Savings Programme (CESP): here the ‘costs’ imposed on energy suppliers are assumed to be 
largely passed on to end users. Total spending on the entire suite of programmes has been 
surprisingly small – a mere 0.24% of GDP in 2010-11 (Marden and Gough 2011). Indeed this total is 
outweighed by spending on the single Winter Fuel Payments benefit. There is no evidence yet of 
fiscal competition between CMPs and the welfare state. 
Distributional impact of current household CMPs 
 
                                                          
2 More radical still is the measure of historical responsibility for accumulated emissions since the Industrial 
Revolution, or ‘ecological debt’. 
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The most recent and thorough analysis of the distribution of all direct household emissions is by 
Fahmy, Thumin and White (2011), mostly relating to the mid-2000s, summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1. Direct household emissions by equivalised household disposable income (metric tonnes) 
Income decile Total direct  Domestic fuel All transport 
1 6.7 5.0 1.8 
2 6.8 5.1 1.7 
3 7.9 5.4 2.5 
4 8.7 5.7 3.0 
5 9.6 5.9 3.7 
6 10.3 6.0 4.4 
7 11.3 6.2 5.1 
8 12.2 6.4 5.8 
9 12.8 6.5 6.3 
10 14.4 7.3 7.1 
Ratio 10:1 2.1 1.5 4.1 
Source: Fahmy et al 2011: Tables A1-A5 
All direct emissions increase with household income, but more so in the case of emissions from 
private vehicles and aviation. Emissions from domestic fuel vary very little across income groups, 
meaning that as a share of income they rise rapidly with falling income. Since supplier obligations, 
which form the core of current CMPs, are intended to be financed by raising overall energy prices to 
domestic and business customers, their impact is highly regressive. The second finding is that many 
other factors also affect emissions. In the case of domestic fuel use the major ones are the size and 
composition of households and the size and construction of dwellings. In the case of private vehicle 
emissions additional factors include levels of car ownership and number of workers in the household 
(see also Dresner and Ekins 2006, Druckman and Jackson 2008, Thumin and White 2008).   
DECC (2010) estimated the impact of mandated policies on energy prices and consumer and medium 
size commercial energy bills in 2010, 2015 and 2020, compared to a counterfactual of no climate 
change policies3. It predicts a real increase in charges to households by 2020 of 33% for electricity 
and 18% for gas; yet predicts a rise of only 1% in average combined bills.  This is because it assumes 
great success in the uptake of energy efficiency measures and renewables incentives. These 
assumptions may be over-optimistic, not to say complacent. Even so, these burdens will fall heavily 
on lower income households (DECC 2010, p.15, Chart 7). Moreover those who are able to benefit 
from energy saving measures, predominantly higher income groups, will see their bills fall while 
those who do not will see their bills rise. For example, those taking up insulation measures are 
predicted to enjoy bills falling by 7% and those taking up insulation and renewables including FIT a 
reduction of 25%, while those with neither will see a further increase of 2%. A more recent model of 
the Green Deal shows 12% of households receiving such measures in 2020 benefitting from reduced 
energy bills, and 88% not receiving them whose bills would rise – by around 0.6% of their income in 
the lowest decile (Hills 2012, Figure 5.1).  
                                                          
3 These estimates take for granted Treasury growth forecasts, now likely to be overestimates, and in the case 
presented here the ‘central’ fossil fuel price scenario in which the price of oil is assumed to be $80 per barrel 
by 2020 (at 2009 prices). 
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The issue of ‘fuel poverty’ is a critical aspect of the distributional impact of CMPs in the UK. The 
Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000 defined someone who is fuel poor as ‘a member of 
a household living on a lower income in a dwelling which cannot be kept warm at reasonable cost’. 
The measure agreed in 2001 defined fuel poverty as existing when ‘a household needs to spend 
more than 10% of its income on total fuel in order to heat its home to an adequate standard (21⁰C in 
living room and 18⁰C in other occupied rooms in daytime hours)’. In response to growing concerns 
about the validity and reliability of this measure, the Hills Report has proposed an indicator closer to 
the original intent, namely where a household has required fuel costs above the median and where 
to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty line (Hills 
2012: 9). Evaluating the proposed Green Deal scheme Hills concludes: ‘on balance a successful Green 
Deal programme, accompanied by an Energy Company Obligation (ECO) that spends a relatively 
small amount of its total available funding on the fuel poor, would be expected to increase fuel 
poverty’ (2012: 112). Higher subsidies, whether public or mandated, would be necessary to avoid 
this, but if mandated would make fuel poor households less attractive to energy suppliers. 
Social policies to moderate the distributional impact of CMPs 
 
I consider here three sets of measures relevant to domestic energy use to moderate such regressive 
impacts: better income compensation, reduced energy bills, and thermal efficiency policies. These 
correspond to the three ‘policy archetypes’ delineated in the Hills Report on Fuel Poverty 2012.4  
1. Better compensation 
The only explicit mechanism for compensating higher fuel bills and fuel poverty are Winter Fuel 
Payments, a flat rate payment of £250 to households with pensioners (£400 if the oldest resident is 
at least 80) and Cold Weather Payments, which provide additional payments of £25 to pensioners 
and low income households during exceptionally cold weather. As Boardman (2010, ch.3) and others 
have shown, these are remarkably poorly targeted. Can more equitable forms of compensation be 
devised? All models so far suggest that, while losses due to higher carbon prices or taxes can be 
compensated on average across the income distribution, large numbers of households continue to 
lose out. This reflects the fact that the variables affecting domestic energy efficiency cannot be easily 
addressed by existing social transfer programmes since they encompass factors such as the energy 
efficiency of dwellings, urban-rural differences, commuting distances and availability of gas supplies. 
Assuming steadily rising fuel prices in the coming decade, another measure would be to 
automatically adjust social benefits using a special low-income price index (see IFS 2011). The central 
DECC projections of fuel cost increases mentioned above will drive up low-income inflation (even 
though lower income households exhibit greater price elasticity than higher income: in other words, 
their consumption will likely decline as energy charges are driven upwards). Adjusting social benefits 
using a separate index for low income households would provide additional protection as we enter 
an era of steadily rising oil—and food—prices. Yet all such policies can do little to compensate those 
households, which for a variety of reasons, often outside their short-term control, face above-
average energy costs. 
                                                          
4 This thus omits policies to improve energy efficiency in personal transport, a large topic in its own right, 
though hardly addressed by government so far. 
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2. Variable energy prices 
Another form of quasi-compensation would be to adjust directly the energy tariffs faced by different 
households and income groups. From 2011 the new Warm Home Discount will automatically award 
pensioners on Pension Credit annual rebates of at least £120 off their electricity bills, with some 
support available for other low income groups. Between 2011 and 2015 this mandatory scheme is 
projected to cost £1.1 billion and to help around 2 million households per year. However, it would 
reach only one quarter of the fuel poor using the Hills measure (Hills 2012: 114). To extend it to all 
households on means-tested benefits would entail using complex data-matching and would be 
‘extremely challenging’.  
Administratively more simple would be to require energy companies to operate a ‘rising block tariff’, 
lowering the marginal costs of initial units of electricity or gas consumed, and raising the marginal 
costs of successive units. (At present energy tariffs work in the opposite way). This would recognize 
the basic need component of the first block of household energy and the progressive choice element 
in successive units. The UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem 2009) model found such a 
scheme would be both progressive and exert price constraints on higher user households. It would 
also help tackle fuel poverty directly since fuel poor households on average consume below average 
amounts of electricity and gas (Committee on Climate Change 2008: 409; Druckman & Jackson 
2008). However the Hills Report concluded it might increase fuel poverty so should not be 
countenanced until more targeted efficiency measures are in place. Perhaps more important, Hills 
and the Climate Change Committee recognise that interfering with energy tariffs would require a 
radical shift in the pricing policies and regulation of private utility companies—a reversal of the 
liberalization and deregulation agenda of the past three decades. This raises substantial political and 
ideological difficulties.  
3. Energy efficiency policies  
EU and UK regulations on the energy efficiency of buildings, vehicles and products appear to have 
been remarkably effective in lowering emissions (Hills 2012: 43). Meanwhile, the main, though small, 
thermal efficiency programme, Warm Front, is to be replaced by the Coalition Green Deal 
programme. This will allow households to obtain energy efficiency upgrades at no upfront cost, 
repaying through the savings they make on their energy bills. The Green Deal will allow private 
energy firms and accredited retailers such as Tesco, B&Q and Marks & Spencer to provide domestic 
and commercial customers with double glazing, loft and wall insulation and other structural 
improvements designed to boost the energy efficiency of their buildings and reduce heating bills. 
The full cost of the measures will be recovered through installments on the household’s energy bill 
over several years. Suitability for the scheme will be assessed on a simple calculation, known as the 
“golden rule” - the predicted savings from the energy efficiency improvements to your property 
must equal or exceed the cost of installation. Energy companies will continue to be required, under 
the new Energy Company Obligation (ECO), to provide basic heating and insulation to the poorest 
and most vulnerable households.  
At the time of writing, precise details of the scheme have not been announced. It is clear that the 
scheme is designed to shift almost all costs to the private sector, reducing the already tiny public 
spending on domestic energy efficiency. It has been criticized by the government’s Committee on 
Climate Change which predicts it will fall far short of its goals, resulting in the insulation of only 
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700,000 lofts (around 10% of potential) and 1.7 million cavity walls (around 30% of potential – and 
only 15% of the rate achieved under CERT).5 Other critics include the Royal Academy of Engineering 
(2012), and the Hills Report which finds that it would be likely to increase fuel poverty, unless 
subsidies through the ECO mechanism or from elsewhere are improved (Hills 2012:112). A recent 
comparison of house retrofitting in Germany and the UK makes the case for more integrated policy 
measures to achieve combined carbon and social goals: ‘The Green Deal, Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) and the Green Investment Bank are all welcome new policies in the right direction. 
But on the basis of the KfW experience, they will not go far enough on any of the key dimensions: 
the regulatory framework, the level of financial incentive, or the clarity of the message about 
integrating home energy efficiency and micro-generation’ (Schröder et al 2011; cf. Power and Zulauf 
2011).  
Conclusions 
To indicate and compare the distributional impact of these strategies Table 2 summarises data from 
the Hills Report on the impact of spending £500m a year according to three measures. These are a) 
the reduction in the fuel poor, defined as those with low incomes and high energy costs; b) the 
reduction in the lifetime fuel poverty gap; and c) the net present value of spending these sums, 
weighing costs and benefits inversely according to household income. The conclusions are clear. 
First, energy efficiency measures are superior on all three counts. Within these, broader targeted 
measures are superior in reducing CO2 emissions, but narrowly targeted measures reduce fuel 
poverty more. The models suggest that supplier funded measures will yield somewhat higher benefit 
cost ratios, due to the assumption that private suppliers will maximise the cost-efficiency of their 
insulation measures. However, this implies that they pick ‘low hanging fruit’ first and will face higher 
expenditures down the road. Second, rebates for low income households would be moderately 
successful especially if tax-funded. The Report does not consider rising block tariffs. Compensating 
low income households via more income is the least successful or efficient, especially the current 
Winter Fuel Payments.  
Table 2. Impact on various measures of fuel poverty of spending £500m via different ‘policy 
archetypes’, 2016. 
   Numbers of 
fuel poor (%) 
Lifetime change in 
fuel poverty gap 
(£m) 
Estimated Net Present Value 
impact, equity weighted (£m 
discounted) 
Thermal 
efficiency 
policy 
Narrowly 
targeted* 
Tax 
funded 
-55 -2630 1730 
  Supplier 
funded 
-55 -2930 1900 
 Broadly 
targeted* 
Tax 
funded 
-18 -680 860 
  Supplier 
funded 
-13 -390 1360 
Reducing 
energy costs 
Rebate policy Tax 
funded 
-28 -70 600 
  Supplier 
funded 
-28 -40 490 
                                                          
5 http://downloads.theccc.org.uk.s3.amazonaws.com/Green%20Deal/green%20deal%20letter%20-
%20201211.pdf 
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Improving 
incomes 
Increase in 
means-tested 
benefits 
 -28 -3 550 
 Increase in 
Winter Fuel 
Payments 
 -10 0 420 
Source: Hills Fuel Poverty Review 2012, Tables 7.13, 7.14, 7.15. 
*Broadly targeted: delivers fully subsidised insulation and heating measures to households living in 
dwellings with a SAP of 55 or less. ‘Narrowly targeted’ restricts this to households receiving means-
tested benefits. 
When focusing on domestic energy emissions, the only effective solution in the medium term, let 
alone the long term, is to develop new forms of eco-social policy. The government Green Deal 
programme is ambitious but will be inadequate in renovating sufficient dwellings or in securing 
inter-household equity. Yet to move further will press against the current economic orthodoxy in 
two respects. First it will require direct tax-financed subsidy, alongside the mandated policies which 
entail further regressive increases in energy prices. Second, at a time of fiscal austerity, it would 
entail a shift towards a different strategy, variously labelled ‘green growth’ (OECD 2010), a ‘low-
carbon industrial revolution’ (Stern 2011) or a Green New Deal (New Economics Foundation 2008, 
UNEP 2009; cf Gough 2011). In conventional terms the level of public investment and subsidy 
required would compete fiscally with current, reduced social spending on the welfare state. Bringing 
together Keynesian and Schumpeterian perspectives, this alternative calls for a sustained public 
programme to invest in renewable energy and to deploy radical retrofitting measures. Advocates 
would also contend that the current post-crisis macro-economic situation is extremely favourable, 
given a glut of savings and very low interest rates. There is thus a unique scope to leverage green 
investment and to fund extensive retrofitting to reduce household emissions (Romani, Stern and 
Zhengalis 2011). 
 
CONSUMPTION-BASED EMISSIONS IN THE UK 
 
I now turn to the broader CAP measure of UK emissions. I analyse their distribution across 
households, consider the policy measures that could reduce consumption-based emissions, and 
propose some combined eco-social policies that could address the distributive impacts. 
This draws on a longer study of the UK in 2006, details of which are provided in Gough et al (2011). It 
links together data from two datasets: the Stockholm Environment Institute’s (SEI’s) Resources and 
Energy Analysis Programme (REAP) which calculates UK carbon emissions at a per capita level, and 
the UK 2006 Expenditure and Food Survey. By so doing we are able to calculate the average 
emissions per household and per person for each COICOP (Classification of Individual Consumption 
by Purpose) category.  
Our study finds that consumption-based GHG emissions in the UK in 2006 averaged 33.2 tonnes 
CO2e per household, or 15.2 tonnes per capita. Table 3 shows that direct emissions – household 
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domestic energy use and petrol for private cars - account for only 20% of total private emissions.6 To 
concentrate on the direct emissions of households is to give an impoverished and distorted picture 
of the carbon and environmental footprint of consumption activities in a rich country like the UK. 
The Table breaks down all emissions into six broad categories. Within private consumption, domestic 
energy and housing (including all housing services, repairs, refurbishments etc) and all spending on 
travel (including holidays abroad) each account for around one quarter of GHG emissions. Food, 
consumables and private services each emit roughly one eighth. The table also shows emissions 
from government services of all kinds, including the NHS, education and social services, accounting 
for 1.8 tonnes per person, but this important issue is not discussed further here (see Gough and 
Meadowcroft 2011). 
Table 3.Household emissions by consumption category 
 
Source: Gough et al 2011, Table 3. 
The distribution of total consumption emissions 
 
The distribution of all household emissions from private consumption is shown in Table 4. It 
distinguishes deciles of gross income7, calculated on an equivalised basis to take into account 
household size and composition. It shows emissions rising in line with income; in particular, the 
highest income decile is out of line, emitting 5.7 tonnes per person more than the next highest 
decile. Income is significantly correlated with all types of emissions, but much more so with 
embodied than direct emissions. Comparing the per capita emissions of the highest and lowest 
deciles, we find these are 4.5 times higher for transport and over 3.5 times higher for private 
services and consumables, compared with a ratio of only 1.8 for the more basic goods of domestic 
energy and food. 
Table 4. Per capita GHG emissions by equivalised gross income decile (tonnes CO2e) 
                                                          
6 Other studies show a higher share of direct emissions within the household sector: Druckman and Jackson 
(2010) show 34% and Baiocchi et al (2010) 30%. This will partly reflect different definitions of what constitutes 
‘direct emissions’. We include only direct fuel use in the home (including electricity) and exclude ‘distribution 
of electricity, gas and other fuels’. 
7 Gross income includes receipt of social security benefits, but does not deduct income tax and national 
insurance contributions. An analysis by disposable income should follow shortly.  
Average in tonnes % Average in tonnes % Average in tonnes % 
Direct emissions 2.71   20.2  5.71     19.8  2.88              20.2  
Indirect emissions 10.69   79.8  23.19     74.0  11.39              79.8  
Domestic Energy and  
Housing 3.98   26.2  8.17     24.6  4.23              25.9  
Food 2.07 13.6   4.54     13.7  2.21              13.5  
Consumables 1.83 12.1   4.07     12.2  1.96              12.0  
Private Services 1.68 11.1   3.73     11.2  1.81              11.1  
Transport 3.78 24.9   8.39     25.2  4.04              24.7  
Public Services 1.78 11.7   4.26     12.8  2.02              12.4  
Total emissions and other 15.18 100.0 33.22 100.0 16.35 100.0 
Per Capita emissions Household emissions Per Equivalent adult emissions 
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Source: Gough et al 2011, Table 4. 
Other variables (for which we have information) that impact on per capita emissions include 
household size, household type, housing tenure, and the employment status and hours of work of 
the household reference person. Regression analysis reveals that income is the major explanatory 
factor: for each £5000 increase in annual income GHG emissions increase by 6.9%. It is highly likely 
that growing income inequality in Britain has widened the emissions gap. Household size varies 
inversely with per capita emissions illustrating economies of scale in consumption. Regression 
analysis finds that single person households have the highest per capita emissions, followed by two-
person households, followed by households with children.8 Non-retired ‘workless’ households emit 
significantly lower amounts than working households when income and composition is controlled.  
If we are concerned with the distributional implications of policies to reduce carbon emissions, it is 
also useful to calculate the ratio of emissions to income. Table 5 then disaggregates this figure by 
income decile and source of emission. Immediately the picture of rising lines is reversed. Per capita 
emissions, and all categories of emissions, are greatest in relation to income in the lowest income 
decile and fall as income rises: the lowest decile emits four times as much in relation to its income as 
the highest. But this pattern varies between consumption categories: the ratio is over six times for 
energy and food, three times for consumer goods and services and 2.3 times for transport. 
Table 5. Kilos of GHG Emissions per £ of Gross Household Annual Income by sector and equivalised 
income decile 
 
This analysis confirms but modifies previous findings for direct emissions. The emission elasticities of 
all the large categories investigated are less than one; thus any rise in carbon prices, when 
generalized throughout the economy, will impact on lower income households more. However the 
degree of regressivity varies according to the category of private consumption expenditure. 
Expenditures on, and emissions from, domestic energy and food take a proportionately higher share 
                                                          
8 This raises issues concerning the ‘emission claims’ of children – see Gough et al 2011, 34-36. 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average 10:1 Ratio
Domestic Energy and Housing 3.08   3.85      3.75      3.56      3.64      3.82      3.95      4.13      4.48      5.59      3.98     1.82         
Food 1.53   1.81      1.93      1.78      1.96      1.97      2.17      2.26      2.50      2.77      2.07     1.81         
Consumables 0.90   1.10      1.38      1.35      1.67      1.69      2.00      2.13      2.68      3.41      1.83     3.78         
Private Services 0.95   1.05      1.18      1.22      1.39      1.53      1.81      1.96      2.28      3.44      1.68     3.61         
Transport 1.73   1.77      2.77      3.05      3.03      3.65      3.89      4.88      5.31      7.73      3.78     4.46         
Other 0.06   0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06      0.06     1.00         
Public Services 1.96   2.14      1.97      1.83      1.70      1.75      1.67      1.64      1.58      1.52      1.78     0.78         
Total 10.22 11.77    13.04    12.84    13.44    14.47    15.55    17.05    18.89    24.52    15.18    2.40          
Equivalised Income Deciles
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average 10:1 Ratio
Domestic E   0.84        0.57        0.46        0.38        0.33        0.27        0.24        0.20        0.17        0.13        0.36        0.16        
Food 0.43        0.30        0.26        0.21        0.19        0.15        0.14        0.12        0.09        0.07        0.20        0.16        
Consumab 0.26        0.18        0.18        0.16        0.17        0.13        0.13        0.11        0.11        0.09        0.15        0.34        
Private Ser 0.27        0.16        0.15        0.14        0.14        0.11        0.12        0.11        0.09        0.09        0.14        0.34        
Transport 0.46        0.28        0.37        0.34        0.29        0.28        0.26        0.25        0.24        0.20        0.30        0.44        
Total 2.26        1.49        1.43        1.23        1.12        0.94        0.89        0.79        0.70        0.58        1.14        0.26        
Mean equiv    6,904     10,983  14,329   18,136   22,402   27,268   32,816   39,665   50,303   74,858   28,901   
Equivalised Income Deciles
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of incomes lower down the income scale than spending on, and emissions from, transport, 
consumer goods and personal services.9  
 Policies to reduce consumption emissions 
 
I summarise here two types of policies which might make serious inroads into all embodied 
households emissions: market-based incentives and behaviour change policies (see Gough 2011 for 
further arguments and references). 
Within economic incentive policies there is a division between those influencing the price of carbon, 
such as a carbon tax, to which the quantity of emissions adjusts, and those capping or otherwise 
influencing the quantity of carbon emitted, to which its price adjusts. The popularity of carbon taxes 
which waxed in the 1980s and early 1990s has waned ever since (Environmental Tax Policy Institute 
2009). According to Helm (2009) and Hepburn (2009) cap-and-trade has triumphed over carbon 
taxation despite its many weaknesses due to the intellectual hegemony of market mechanisms, 
governments’ fears of new taxes, and new vested interests in carbon trading. Thus EU member 
states will rely in the medium term on cap and trade schemes, of which the major programme is the 
EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). This has many defects but targets about half of all industry and 
will thus in time raise the embodied carbon costs over a wider range of goods and services. As our 
research shows, the impact of any rise in the price of carbon will bear most heavily on low income 
households and within these on smaller and workless households. The impact of ETS and broad 
carbon taxation will be less inequitable than current government policies but it will remain 
regressive (cf Büchs et al 2011:7). 
Policies to modify consumer behaviour in a low carbon direction vary according to underlying 
theory. They vary from orthodox economic consumer behaviour theory through psychology-based 
theories and advocates of ‘nudging’, to more sociological approaches that recognise multiple drivers 
(Versky and Kahenmann 1974, Thaler and Sunstein 2008, DEFRA 2008, Taylor-Gooby 2011). Others 
go further still to recognise the role of intentional modifications of behaviour pursued by corporate 
interests (Seyfang and Paavola 2008) or the role played by ‘systems of provision’ locking households 
into patterns of consumption (Jackson and Papathanasopoulou 2008). To counter these, some 
argue, requires more government regulation, pro-environmental investment and public planning. 
‘Why retreat to nudge, where other influences may shape choices?’ (Taylor-Gooby 2011: 40). Others 
contend that these also require strong public action and collective engagement at sub-national 
levels (Dobson 2006, Ostrom 2009, Whitmarsh 2011). It is safe to conclude that moving to low 
carbon lifestyles will require forms of collective action that go well beyond current government 
strategies for climate change mitigation. Social policies to secure equitable carbon reduction 
 
                                                          
9 This echoes previous findings that inequality in indirect emissions exceeds inequality in direct emissions 
(Papathanasopoulou and Jackson 2009). In a time series analysis they also demonstrate that the former 
inequality increased at a faster rate from 1968 to 2000. 
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I conclude by surveying three policies which might contribute to the reduction of embodied 
emissions from consumption in an equitable way: taxing consumption and redistributing incomes, 
rationing carbon, and reducing working time. 
Taxing consumption 
One solution would be to tax consumption spending directly, via either a progressive consumption 
tax or a luxury goods tax. Frank (2011) argues for the former, on the grounds that the spending 
habits of the rich foster an unending expansion in general notions of material adequacy. A 
consumption tax could be implemented as a progressive income tax that excludes savings. However, 
this would benefit higher income groups, who save more, and would over time increase, not 
diminish, wealth inequality. More appropriate is selective taxation of high emissions consumption, 
such as air travel, though this would further challenge orthodox assumptions that consumer 
sovereignty should not be questioned except in case of direct harm.   
There is circumstantial evidence, however, that the carbon savings in carbon and GHGs from such 
schemes would be less than might be expected. In a novel study, Druckman and Jackson (2010) 
estimate the GHG emissions of a ‘bare necessities’ household budget. They used the JRF minimum 
income standard for a decent life, which assumes drastic limits on consumption, such as: no private 
cars (public transport passes and occasional use of taxis instead), all households occupy dwellings 
closely matched to their family size, and all dwellings have basic insulation already fitted. Assuming 
that the entire UK population is living at these adjusted standards they estimate that average 
household GHG emissions would have been just 37% lower than actual in 2004: a radical 
transformation of consumption yields a relatively small reduction in emissions. This evidence 
suggests that traditional redistributive social policies alone would not suffice in an era of serious 
climate change and climate mitigation. 
Rationing and trading carbon 
Rationing personal carbon allowances would tackle both overall household emissions and the 
distributional dilemma head-on by instituting a form of universal carbon rationing, or personal 
carbon allowances, coupled with trading (PCAT). There exist a wide variety of such proposals, but all 
entail a cap on a country’s total GHG emissions (decreasing year by year) and a division of this 
amount into equal annual allowances for each adult resident (usually with a lower allowance for 
each child) (Environmental Audit Committee 2008; Fawcett and Parag 2010). In effect, a dual 
accounting standard and currency is developed—energy, goods and services have both a money 
price and a carbon price. Those who emit less carbon than the average can sell their surplus and 
gain, while higher emitters would pay a market price for their excess. Advocates claim that a PCAT 
scheme covering domestic energy, road fuel and air travel would be on average quite progressive. In 
addition, it would make real the carbon rationing required and could contribute to bringing about 
the behavioural change discussed above. It could be implemented using personal carbon cards and 
smart metering, though the administrative difficulties should not be underestimated. In effect it 
would constitute a carbon form of the Basic Income idea, with perhaps greater legitimacy. 
PCAT would be inherently progressive, so it overcomes the distributional dilemma inherent in 
upstream cap and trade schemes and carbon taxation. However, it does not avoid all issues of 
fairness, for example, those living in inefficient or underutilized housing, dependent on car travel, or 
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with special needs. Too many exceptions to the standard allowance could undermine the scheme, 
but too few would result in rough justice, which could undermine public support (in addition to the 
political risks of such an overtly redistributive project). For these and other reasons, the UK 
government in 2008 abandoned its plans for testing the idea. A recent series of studies considered it 
a suitable future framework for delivering long-term, sustainable cuts in carbon emissions in a way 
that other policies cannot. However, its integration into the existing policy landscape, notably 
upstream carbon trading schemes like the ETS, would raise problematic questions which differ from 
country to country according to their energy sources, transport infrastructure, and other factors 
(Fawcett and Parag 2010).  
Crucially for our argument a way would need to be found to extend PCAT to include the carbon 
content of major supermarket goods and important services in a modern economy. The Tesco 
pledge to put carbon labels on 70,000 products has hardly begun. To implement a wide-ranging 
PCAT scheme would again require further public regulation and intervention in the wholesale and 
retail sector10.  
Reduced working hours 
A final radical policy is to reduce working hours, which, it is argued, could reduce emissions in two 
ways: via the scale effect, by reducing incomes, expenditures, consumption and emissions, and via 
the compositional effect, by altering time and expenditure budgets towards lower carbon intensity. 
This introduces a new and radical policy goal for climate mitigation: to constrain aggregate demand. 
Assuming a secular rise in productivity, this amounts to taking more of these gains in the form of 
rising leisure rather than consumption. Since 1975, when they had similar hours of work, the US has 
reduced average hours by 4% and Germany by 22% (Schor 2012). All other things being equal, 
Germany has deployed its productivity dividend in a less environmentally harmful way than the 
United States. Schor (2012), in a cross-national analysis of 29 OECD countries, finds that ‘annual 
working hours are a large and significant predictor of ecological outcomes’ (cf Nässen and Larsson 
2011). Several European countries have initiated experiments in reducing work time which offer 
constructive lessons, including the French 35 hour week and the Belgian Time Credit Scheme 
(Fagnani and Letablier 2004). The present Belgian Time Credit Scheme enables workers to 
accumulate rights to career breaks. More radical proposals have been developed by Nef (2010) and 
Schor (2012). Such a policy could in principle redistribute employment opportunities, enhance 
individual choice and wellbeing, and save carbon. However, care would be needed to ensure that 
this policy shift would not raise other distributional dilemmas, including the risk of increasing 
poverty among the low paid, and growing ‘time inequality’ between the higher and lower paid 
(Burchardt 2008). Working time reduction would need to be combined with new forms of income 
support for low earners and other measures to adjust incentives for employers and employees. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Table 6 summarises the structure and sequence of the arguments in this article.  
                                                          
10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/13/tesco-carbon-labels 
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Table 6. Summary: Policies to reconcile equity and sustainability 
 1.Current policy framework 2.Enhanced policy 
framework 
Climate mitigation target PAP, and within this direct household 
carbon emissions 
CAP: All embodied 
consumption emissions 
Climate mitigation goals Pricing carbon Develop low carbon consumer 
preferences 
 Promote clean energy Restrain consumer demand 
 Improve energy efficiency  
Policies to combine with 
social equity 
Improved compensation Modify consumer preferences 
 Social energy tariffs Tax consumption 
 Thermal efficiency: Green Deal Ration carbon 
 Green New Deal Reduce working time 
 
Two major conclusions follow. First, only energy saving policies can secure long-term reductions in 
direct carbon emissions coupled with avoidance of inequitable and unjust distributive outcomes. It is 
highly likely that these eco-social programmes will require substantially higher levels of public 
intervention, regulation, planning and subsidy than currently envisaged. To pursue this in the 
contemporary, long-drawn-out, post-crisis era will entail further challenges to contemporary neo-
liberal orthodoxies, in particular some form of Green New Deal and a switch in arguments for public 
spending from compensation to eco-social investment (Helm 2012, Compass 2011). 
Second, there is an ethical and political case for monitoring and targeting the total consumption-
based emissions of rich countries like the UK. This would require policy goals additional to current 
climate mitigation efforts, namely measures to develop low carbon consumer preferences and to 
restrain overall consumer demand. These policies might include carbon rationing and reductions in 
working time. Again this would challenge the dominant doxa of the last three decades. We will need 
to move beyond countervailing and compensatory social policies to integrated eco-social 
programmes. 
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